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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Following early contributions by Phelps (1961, 1965) and Diamond (1965), the
study of the optimal capital accumulation consists in deriving formal conditions
under which the capital stock maximizes the consumption per head at the sta-
tionary equilibrium. In a two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with
no technological progress, the Golden Rule states that steady-state consump-
tion per head is maximized when the marginal productivity of capital equals
the sum of the cohort growth rate and the depreciation rate of capital.
The standard Golden Rule concerns the long-run dynamics of an economy.
Given that the population is likely to vary strongly over long periods of time, it
is natural to explore whether the Golden Rule remains valid in a more general
framework with a varying demography. In a pioneer contribution, Samuelson
(1975) showed that, when the social planner chooses the fertility rate in addition
to capital, the Golden Rule still prevails, with the di¤erence that the cohort
growth rate in the Golden Rule formula takes now its optimal value. More
recently, the Golden Rule was also shown to be robust to the inclusion of the
survival rate in the social planning program (see de la Croix et al. 2012).
But the introduction of a variable population size raises serious di¢ culties
regarding the selection of an adequate social objective. Those di¢ culties are
general, and occur each time we face what Part (1984) called a "di¤erent num-
ber choice", including in the particular context of optimal capital accumulation.1
For instance, the "optimal" fertility derived by Samuelson (1975) depends on
the particular social objective - average utilitarianism - that he assumed. Other
normative criteria could have been used instead, as there is no decisive argument
supporting that particular social welfare criterion.2
The existence of risky and unequal lifetimes tends also to question the social
objective to be pursued when considering optimal capital accumulation.3 To see
this, consider a 2-period OLG economy, where the survival from the rst period
(working period) to the second period (retirement) occurs with an exogenous
probability . Under standard assumptions on individual preferences, all young
agents save, at the laissez-faire, some resources for their old days. The problem
is that, at the next period, only a fraction  of savers will enjoy their savings,
whereas a fraction 1    of the savers will not.4 It follows from this that, at
the laissez-faire, there exist substantial welfare inequalities across members of
a given cohort, between agents who turn out to be long-lived and agents who
turn out to be short-lived. The latter ones su¤er not only from a shorter life,
but, also, from the lost savings due to unanticipated death.
From a normative perspective, welfare losses due to longevity inequalities
are problematic. Indeed, even if it is true that all agents did, at the young
age, what they planned to do, and saved as much as they wanted, it remains
nonetheless that those savings decisions were made ex ante, that is, before one
knows ones own longevity, and, as such, had to rely on survival probabilities.
Those probabilities are useful information when making decisions in front of
risk, but the problem is that, at the individual level, those probabilities all
1See also Blackorby et al. (2005) and Arrhenius (2012) on population ethics.
2For instance, Renstrom and Spataro (2011) have recently studied the optimal capital and
fertility under critical-level utilitarianism.
3See Broome (2004) on the selection of a social criterion under di¤erentiated longevity.
4We assume here the Law of Large Numbers.
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turn out to be false ex post. In the second period, each agent is either alive
or dead, and if he had known, in advance, his actual longevity - rather than
his expected longevity - he would probably have saved di¤erently. One can
thus, following Fleurbaey (2010), interpret situations of risk as situations of
incomplete information: young agents who save resources for their old age do
not know their actual length of life, and this lack of knowledge casts some doubt
on the capacity of those agents to do what is the best for them.
Interpreting situations of risk as situations of incomplete information sup-
ports, as argued by Fleurbaey (2010), the replacement of (standard) ex ante
social welfare criteria, which rely on individual expected outcomes, by ex post
social welfare criteria, which are based on individual realized outcomes. Note
that those two families of social criteria can, in some cases, lead to similar opti-
mal allocations. For instance, as emphasized by Hammond (1981), the average
utilitarian social objective can be interpreted either as the expected utility of a
representative agent, or as the average realized welfare in the society. However,
once there is some ethical concern for equality, the distinction between ex ante
and ex post social welfare criteria becomes crucial.5
In the example of prematurely dead savers, where longevity inequalities are
exogenous, there is a strong support for adopting an egalitarian social objec-
tive. Indeed, as argued by Fleurbaey (2008), welfare inequalities are acceptable
only if these result from di¤erences in responsibility characteristics, but not if
these result from circumstance characteristics, for which individuals cannot be
held responsible. Given that prematurely dead savers cannot be regarded as
responsible for their realized longevity, there exists a strong ethical support for
adopting egalitarian social objectives in that context. Therefore, if we interpret
the situation of risky longevity as a situation of incomplete information, there
is a strong support for adopting an ex post egalitarian social objective, which
favors the reduction of inequalities in ex post lifetime welfare.
That rationale has led Fleurbaey et al. (2010) to study, in a two-period
model with risky lifetime, the optimal allocation of resources, under a social
objective focusing on the realized welfare of the individuals who turn out to be
the worst-o¤ ex post, that is, after individual longevities have been revealed.6 In
that paper, it is shown that the ex post egalitarian optimal allocation achieves a
full compensation for premature death, that is, it makes, ex post, short-lived and
long-lived agents equally well-o¤. That result is somewhat surprising: compen-
sation for a premature death may seem a priori unfeasible, because short-lived
individuals cannot be identied ex ante, and cannot be a¤ected by any transfer
ex post. However, it is possible to provide a full compensation to the short-lived
by concentrating the consumption of resources early on the lifecycle.
Whereas that ex post egalitarian social objective may seem quite plausible
in a static framework, it is not obvious to see what its consequences are for the
optimal capital accumulation problem. How would a fair capital accumulation
rule look like? To what extent would this di¤er from the standard Golden Rule?
More precisely, does egalitarianism lead to a lower or, alternatively, to a higher
optimal capital in comparison to standard average utilitarianism?
The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal capital accumulation
5On the distinction between equality of opportunity ex ante and equality of opportunity
ex post, see Fleurbaey and Peragine (2012).
6Note that, in general, the worst-o¤ individuals are those who turn out to have a shorter
life than others. But, as we discuss below, this is not necessarily the case.
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in an economy where individual lifetime is risky, and where individuals turn
out to have unequal longevities. For that purpose, we consider a two-period
OLG model where the probability of survival to the old age (second period)
depends on the level of preventive health investment per worker made during
the young age (rst period). Within that framework, we characterize the optimal
capital accumulation rule under two distinct long-run social optima: on the one
hand, the average utilitarian criterion, which focuses on the steady-state average
welfare; on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian criterion, which focuses on
the welfare of the worst-o¤ individuals born at the steady-state.
The reason why we introduce here an endogenous survival probability has
to do with the recent emphasis on the determinants of mortality variations in
the OLG literature.7 Note, however, that the above discussion on the choice of
an adequate social objective under unequal longevities is also relevant for that
literature. For instance, models by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty
(2004) and Galor and Moav (2005) are frameworks where agents do not choose
their life expectancy, which depends on the level of human capital (in Blackburn
and Cipriani), on the level of physical capital (in Ckakraborty), or on the genetic
type of the agent (in Galor and Moav). Other models, such as Bhattacharya
and Qiao (2005) and Boucekkine and La¤argue (2010) include agents who can
a¤ect their life expectancy through some investment in their health, but still
cannot choose a certain lifetime. In those models, agents with the same health
investment can actually turn out to have unequal longevities.8 Therefore, those
economies, where agents can hardly be regarded as responsible for inequalities
in realized longevity, invite an ex post egalitarian social objective. The present
paper proposes to characterize optimal capital accumulation under such a social
objective, and contrasts it with the one under standard average utilitarianism.
Anticipating on our results, we rst show that, when the fertility rate is
exogenously given, the egalitarian social optimum involves the same optimal
capital as under average utilitarianism. However, once fertility is chosen by
the social planner, the egalitarian optimum involves, under plausible conditions
on production, a higher optimal capital and a lower optimal fertility than the
average utilitarian optimum. Thus being egalitarian reinforces the necessity to
accumulate capital. Finally, we show that our results remain globally valid in a
second-best framework where longevity investments are not directly chosen by
the social planner, but are exogenously related to the capital level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 derives optimal capital and fertility under average utilitarianism. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the social optimum under an ex post egalitarian objective.
Section 5 considers the second-best framework where health investments are
exogenously linked to the capital level. Section 6 concludes.
7See the survey by Boucekkine et al. (2008).
8This is also the case in the real world, where longevity inequalities are largely due to
factors on which individuals have no inuence, such as genetic background (see Christensen
et al 2006). Note also that, even though empirical studies, such as Kaplan et al. (1987),
Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and Jones (2008), highlight the impact of some
behaviors on the average (or expected ) longevity, those studies identify only risk factors, but
not factors a¤ecting, for sure, the longevity realized at the individual level.
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2 The model
We consider an OLG model with the same population structure and production
technology as in the model developed by Chakraborty (2004). Time is discrete
and goes from 0 to innity. Longevity is risky: all agents live a rst period
(young age), but do not necessarily survive to the second period (old age).
Demography. The size of the cohort born at time t is denoted by Lt.
Each young adult has n children (n  0):
Lt+1 = nLt (1)
All members of cohort t live the rst period for sure, but only a proportion
t+1 of that cohort will survive to the second period. The proportion of survivors
t+1 depends on the amount of health expenditures per young adult ht:
t+1 = (ht) (2)
We assume, as usual, that 0 <  (ht) < 1 for all ht  0, and that 0(ht) > 0. It
is also assumed that  (0) = ~ > 0 and that limht!1(ht) =  < 1.
Preferences. Agents have time-additive lifetime welfare, which depends
on consumption per period. If the utility of being dead is normalized to zero,
the lifetime welfare of the short-lived agents of cohort t, denoted by Uslt , is:
Uslt = u(ct) (3)
where we assume, as usual, that u0(ct) > 0 and u00(ct) < 0, that is, that tem-
poral welfare is increasing and concave in consumption ct.9 For the long-lived
members of cohort t, lifetime welfare, denoted by U llt , is:
10
U llt = u(ct) + u(dt+1) (4)
where dt+1 is the consumption at the old age.
When considering the optimal health investment, a central aspect of pref-
erences concerns the intercept of the temporal utility function. Following the
literature, we assume that there exists a consumption c  0 such that:11
u(c) = 0 (5)
Put it di¤erently, there exists a welfare-neutral consumption level c that makes
an individual indi¤erent between further life with that consumption and death.
Production. The production of an output Yt involves labour Lt and cap-
ital Kt, according to the production function:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) (6)
9We also assume limc!0u0(c) = +1 (see de la Croix and Michel 2002 p. 5).
10For the simplicity of presentation, we abstract here from pure time preferences.
11See Becker et al. (2005).
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where Kt denotes the total capital stock, while Lt is the labour force, which
coincides here with the whole cohort at birth. The function F () is a positively-
valued production function, increasing and strictly concave with respect to cap-
ital. Capital depreciates at a constant rate , with 0 <   1.
Under constant returns to scale, the production function can be written as:
yt = f(kt) (7)
where yt is the output per worker, and kt is the capital stock per worker, while
f () = F (kt; 1) denotes the production function in its intensive form. Under
the above assumptions on F (), we have, for kt > 0, that f(kt) > 0, f 0(kt) > 0
and f 00(kt) < 0.12 The marginal productivity of labour is:
!(kt) = f(kt)  ktf 0(kt) (8)
From the concavity of f(kt), we have: !(kt)  0 and !0(kt) =  f 00(kt) > 0.
Resource constraint The resource constraint of the economy, stating
that what is produced is either consumed or invested, is:
F (Kt; Lt) = ctLt + htLt + dt(ht 1)Lt 1 +Kt+1   (1  )Kt (9)
At the steady-state and in intensive terms, we have:
f(k)  k(n+    1) = c+ h+ (h)
n
d (10)
Note the roles played by demographic variables in the resource constraint.
The fertility rate n has two e¤ects: on the one hand, n puts some pressure on
the available resources (the LHS), by reducing, ceteris paribus, the sustainable
capital available for each worker (i.e. the "Solow e¤ect"); on the other hand,
n also a¤ects the spending part of the constraint (the RHS), by weakening
the weight of the elderlys consumption (i.e. the "Samuelson e¤ect"). The
survival rate  only a¤ects the economys spending (RHS), by making the olds
(aggregate) consumption larger ceteris paribus.
3 The utilitarian rst-best problem
To characterize the optimal capital accumulation, we will focus here on a sta-
tionary equilibrium, where all per worker variables kt, ht and t are constant
over time, whereas all aggregate variables, such as production Yt, total capital
stock Kt, and total consumption Ct grow at a rate n.13
We consider the problem of a utilitarian social planner, who selects capital,
consumptions, health investment and fertility in such a way as to maximize the
average lifetime welfare prevailing at the stationary equilibrium, subject to the
resource constraint of the economy. That planning problem is:
max
c;d;k;h;n
u(c) + (h)u(d)
s.t. c+
(h)
n
d = f(k)  k (n+    1)  h
s.t. h  0
12See de la Croix and Michel (2002) on this.
13Therefore we will, in the rest of this section, delete time indices.
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The planners problem can be rewritten by means of the following Lagrangian:
max
c;d;k;n;h
u(c) + (h)u(d) + 

f(k)  k (n+    1)  h  c  (h)
n
d

+ h
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, while
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for
h. The rst-order conditions (FOCs) can be rewritten as:
u0(c)
u0(d)
= n (11)
f 0(k) =  + n  1 (12)
k =
(h)
(n)
2 d (13)
u0(c)  0(h) [u(d)  du0(d)] =  (14)
as well as the conditions
  0; f(k)  k (n+    1)  h  c+ (h)
n
d (15)
  0; h  0 (16)
with complementary slackness.
From condition (11), we see that the marginal rate of substitution between
consumptions at the two ages of life should be equal to the optimal fertility rate
n. Expression (12) is the standard Golden Rule for optimal capital accumula-
tion, stating that the marginal productivity of capital should be equal to the
sum of the depreciation rate of capital  and the cohort growth rate n  1.
Condition (13) states that the optimal fertility n should be such that the
(negative) capital dilution e¤ect (the LHS) equals the (positive) intergenera-
tional e¤ect (the RHS). Note that, on the basis of equation (13), nothing guar-
antees that the optimal fertility n is higher (or equal to) the replacement fertility
level n = 1. Thus it is possible to have an optimal fertility n strictly below the
replacement fertility rate (n = 1), with the corollary that the population be-
comes extinct asymptotically. That case is especially likely to prevail when the
intergenerational redistribution e¤ect is small in comparison with the capital
dilution e¤ect.
Condition (14) states that an interior optimal health investment h exists
only if there exists some level of h > 0 such that the marginal welfare loss from
foregone consumption (1st term of the LHS) equals the marginal welfare gain
from health investment (2nd term of the LHS), yielding  = 0. That condition
holds if and only if we have, under h > 0:
u0(c) = 0(h) [u(d)  du0(d)]
That equality requires that the second period is, at the optimum, worth being
lived, that is, that u(d) > 0 or d > c. This condition is satised either when
individuals assign a high value to life (i.e. c is low), or when the economy is
very productive, insuring that the optimal second-period consumption exceeds
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c.14 That latter assumption is quite weak, and so we can expect, under general
conditions, an interior optimal health investment.
Proposition 1 summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 The average utilitarian rst-best optimum fc; d; k; n; hg is
such that:
u0(c)
u0(d)
= n
f 0(k) =  + n   1
k =
(h)
(n)2
d
u0(c) = 0(h) [u(d)  du0(d)]
c +
(h)
n
d = f(k)  k (n +    1)  h
h > 0
Proof. See the above FOCs.
The above conditions are necessary, but not su¢ cient for an interior op-
timum. As it is well-known, su¢ ciency requires to consider second-order con-
ditions, which may not be satised under endogenous fertility and mortality.
Given that the literature has already examined those second-order conditions,
we will here assume that second-order conditions are satised, so that the above
rst-order conditions characterize the interior social optimum.15
Finally, it should be stressed here that the conditions mentioned in Propo-
sition 1 may be satised by several distinct vectors fc; d; k; n; hg, so that
those conditions do not guarantee the uniqueness of the social optimum. Actu-
ally, in the simple case where demography is xed, i.e. n = n and  = , simple
assumptions on the production function f(k) [f(k) > 0, f 0(k) > 0, f 00(k) < 0 for
k > 0] and on the utility function u(c) [u(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0 for c > 0, as well as
limc!0u0(c) = +1], together with the assumption f 0(+1) < + n  1 < f 0(0),
su¢ ce to guarantee the uniqueness of the utilitarian social optimum (see de la
Croix and Michel 2002 p. 78-79). However, once n and  are variables, the
uniqueness issue becomes much trickier, since standard assumptions on produc-
tion and utility functions do no longer guarantee the uniqueness of the social
optimum. We do not explore the uniqueness issue further here, since our em-
phasis in this paper lies on the comparison of that utilitarian optimum with the
egalitarian optimum, and, for that purpose, the uniqueness issue is not crucial.
Actually, the comparison of the two optima, based on rst-order conditions,
keeps its entire signicance even when the uniqueness of the social optima un-
der comparison does not prevail, because we know that the optimum, whatever
it is, must necessarily satisfy the associate set of rst-order conditions.
14Note that assigning a high value to life coïncides with a low level of c, and not with a
high level of c. The reason is that, if agents value strongly the mere fact of being alive, even
extremely low consumption levels will make them regard life as better than death. Therefore
the threshold c must be very low in that case.
15See Deardor¤ (1976) and Michel and Pestieau (1993) on the interiority of the optimal
fertility rate. See de la Croix et al (2012) on the interiority of the optimum survival rate.
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4 The egalitarian rst-best problem
Let us now contrast the average utilitarian social optimum with the ex post
egalitarian social optimum. Whereas average utilitarianism can be interpreted
as the maximization of the expected welfare of a representative agent from
an ex ante perspective (see Hammond 1981), the ex post egalitarian optimum
considers, on the contrary, what maximizes the realized - rather than expected
- welfare of the worst-o¤ individuals at the stationary equilibrium.
The motivations for focusing on the worst-o¤ individuals are the following.
Clearly, the social objective behind the standard Golden Rule - i.e. the maxi-
mization of the steady-state average welfare - makes a lot of sense in the context
where the Golden Rule was initially studied: a context where cohorts are all
made of identical agents. However, once risky mortality is introduced, taking
the maximization of average welfare seems less adequate from an ethical per-
spective. In our model, individuals are all identical ex ante, but some persons
will, ex post, turn out to have a shorter life than others. Given that being
long-lived or short-lived is here a matter of pure luck, it makes sense to take,
as a social objective, not the maximization of average welfare, but, rather, the
maximization of the welfare of the unlucky, worst-o¤ individuals.16
Since the worst-o¤ agents at the steady-state can be either the short-lived,
who enjoy a lifetime welfare equal to u(c), or the long-lived, who enjoy a lifetime
welfare u(c) + u(d), the social planners problem is here:
max min
c;d;k;h;n
fu(c); u(c) + u(d)g
s.t. c+
(h)
n
d = f(k)  k (n+    1)  h
s.t. h  0
That social planning problem is less straightforward than the standard util-
itarian problem. The reason is that the objective function to be maximized is
continuous but not di¤erentiable. However, the identication of the worst-o¤
agents in the population can help us to rewrite that planning problem in a more
convenient manner.
Actually, whereas common sense identies the worst-o¤ individuals with the
short-lived ones, this is not necessarily the case. Whether the short-lived or
the long-lived is the worst-o¤ depends on whether second-period consumption
d exceeds the welfare neutral level c or not:
Usl 7 U ll () u(d) ? 0 () d ? c
In the light of that condition, we can rewrite the above social planners
problem under a much simpler form. Actually, the egalitarian planning problem
can be rewritten as the maximization of the welfare of the short-lived individuals
(i.e. u(c)) subject to the constraint that the lifetime welfare of the long-lived
individuals is not inferior to the lifetime welfare of the short-lived ones (i.e.
u(c) + u(d)  u(c)). Indeed, if we had u(d) < 0, long-lived agents would
be worse o¤ than short-lived agents, so that the objective of maximizing the
welfare of the short-lived would not make sense. Hence the egalitarian social
16See Fleurbaey et al (2010) on the ethical foundations behind the maximization of the ex
post welfare of the worst-o¤ individuals under risky longevity.
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planners problem consists in maximizing the welfare of the short-lived subject
to the constraint u(d)  0, and can thus be rewritten as:
max
c;d;k;n;h
u(c) + 

f(k)  k (n+    1)  h  c  (h)
n
d

+  [u(d)] + h
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint,
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for
welfare at the old age, whereas  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
non-negativity constraint for health investment. The rst-order conditions are:
u0(c) =  (17)

(h)
n
= u0(d) (18)
f 0(k) = n+    1 (19)
k =
(h)
(n)
2 d (20)


1 +
0(h)
n
d

=  (21)
as well as the conditions
  0; f(k)  k (n+    1)  h  c+ (h)
n
d (22)
  0; u(d)  0 (23)
  0; h  0 (24)
with complementary slackness.
From FOC (19), it appears that the optimal capital accumulation remains
determined by the standard Golden Rule. FOC (21) suggests that the optimal
level of health investment h is a corner solution, and equal to 0.17 That corner
solution for health investment may seem surprising, but is actually quite intu-
itive: for the unlucky agents who do not reach the old age, preventive spending
is a waste of resources, so that it is optimal to set those expenditures to zero. Re-
garding the last two FOCs, it is clear that it is optimal to exhaust the economys
resources, so that the budget constraint is, at the optimum, a strict equality.
Moreover, regarding consumption at the old age, we must have, at the optimum,
that second-period consumption d equals c, in such a way as to obtain u(d) = 0.
Substituting for h = 0 and for d = c in (20), we obtain:
k =
~
(n)
2 c
We see that, ceteris paribus, the capital dilution e¤ect (i.e. the LHS) is the same
as under average utilitarianism, but the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect
17 Indeed, an interior health investment would require the LHS of (21) to be equal to 0, that
is:
u0(c) + u0(d)d
0(h)
(h)
= 0
The rst term of the LHS is necessarily positive, and the second term as well, so that this
equality is always violated.
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(i.e. the RHS) is here weakened in comparison to what holds under utilitarian-
ism. The reason is that, under an interior utilitarian optimum, we necessarily
have u(d) > 0, implying d > c.18 As a consequence, we can expect, ceteris
paribus, fewer children under egalitarianism than under average utilitarianism.
Thus the possibility of an optimal fertility rate strictly smaller than the replace-
ment rate n = 1 is, ceteris paribus, more plausible here than under the average
utilitarian optimum. The possibility of an optimal fertility lower than the re-
placement rate is, ceteris paribus, larger when the minimum survival chance ~
is low, and when the welfare neutral consumption level c is also low.19
Note, however, that this result is only true under a given k, so that further
calculations will be necessary to have an unambiguous comparison of the two
social optima. Prior to this, Proposition 2 summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 The egalitarian rst-best optimum fc; d; k; n; hg is such
that:
c = f(k)  k (n +    1)  ~
n
c
d = c
f 0(k) =  + n   1
k =
~
(n)2
c
h = 0
Proof. See the above FOCs.
As under the utilitarian optimum, it may be the case that several vectors
fc; d; k; n; hg satisfy the above conditions. Hence the uniqueness of the
egalitarian optimum is not guaranteed. However, in order to compare the util-
itarian and the egalitarian optima, it is not necessary to be certain that each
of those social optima is unique. Indeed, given that each social optimum neces-
sarily satises a set of rst-order conditions (mentioned in Proposition 1 for the
utilitarian optimum, and in Proposition 2 for the egalitarian one), the compar-
ison of the two optima based on the study of those rst-order conditions leads
to conclusions that hold whatever those optima are unique or not.
When comparing the egalitarian and utilitarian rst-best optima, some ob-
vious di¤erences appear. First, the optimal level of prevention under the egali-
tarian optimum, which is equal to zero, is lower than under utilitarianism (when
the utilitarian optimum is an interior solution). The reason is that, from the
point of view of average welfare, it makes sense to spend some resources to raise
the survival probability. On the contrary, from the point of view of a short-lived
person, preventive health spending are just a waste of resources.
The comparison of optimal consumption levels is more complex, since it
depends on the optimal level of capital and fertility under the two social ob-
jectives. Let us take, as a starting point, the case where fertility is not chosen
by the social planner, but is equal to an exogenous level n = n. In that case,
the optimal capital satises, under utilitarianism and egalitarianism, the same
18See supra.
19 Indeed, if c is very low, there is little welfare gain from fertility, and so the social optimum
involves a fertility rate less than the replacement level.
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condition, which is the standard Golden Rule:
f 0(k) =  + n  1
Given that both  and n are constant, the optimal capital is the same whatever
the social objective is. That result is quite intuitive. Our egalitarian social
objective cares about the worst-o¤ individuals living at the steady-state, and,
as such, focuses on intragenerational justice. On the contrary, the Golden Rule,
which aims at maximizing consumption possibilities at the stationary equilib-
rium, concerns the intergenerational allocation of resources, and remains thus
relevant under our (intragenerational) egalitarian objective. Indeed, the Golden
Rule guarantees the largest aggregate consumption possibilities at the steady-
state, and those consumption possibilities can be used di¤erently depending on
the adopted conception of intragenerational justice.
But that kind of intra- versus intergenerational separation result collapses
once fertility is chosen by the social planner. Indeed, in that general case, the
optimal capital and fertility levels satisfy respectively:20
f 0(ku) =  + nu   1
ku =
(hu)
(nu)2
du
for the utilitarian optimum, and
f 0(ke) =  + ne   1
ke =
~
(ne)2
c
for the egalitarian optimum. From those conditions, it can be shown that the two
optimal capital and fertility levels di¤er under the two social objectives. While
calculations are left to the Appendix, Proposition 3 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 Under the utilitarian and the egalitarian optima, we have:
 if f 0(k)   + 1 > 2k!0(k), we have: ku > ke and nu < ne;
 if f 0(k)   + 1 = 2k!0(k), we have: ku = ke and nu = ne;
 if f 0(k)   + 1 < 2k!0(k), we have: ku < ke and nu > ne.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology yt = Akt , we have, under a full
depreciation of capital, that:
 if  > 1=2, we have: ku > ke and nu < ne;
 if  = 1=2, we have: ku = ke and nu = ne;
 if  < 1=2, we have: ku < ke and nu > ne.
20Here we use the superscripts u and e to refer to, respectively, the utilitarian and egalitarian
optima.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, the egalitarian optimum may, in general, involve a lower or a higher
capital than the utilitarian optimum once the fertility is also chosen by the social
planner. The prevailing inequality depends on the level of the depreciation rate
of capital , as well as on the properties of the production process.
As stated in the second part of Proposition 3, we can see that, under a full
depreciation of capital  = 1 and a Cobb-Douglas production function with
 < 1=2 (as usually calibrated), the optimal capital under egalitarianism is
superior to its level under average utilitarianism. Inversely, the optimal fertil-
ity is larger under utilitarianism. Note that this comparison does not tell us
whether a particular social optimum involves a fertility rate strictly lower than
the replacement fertility n = 1. However, we know for sure that, in the case
of  < 1=2, if the utilitarian optimum involves a fertility rate lower than the
replacement level, this will be also the case for the egalitarian optimum, since
this optimum involves a lower fertility than the utilitarian one.
Hence, even if the optimal capital remains, under egalitarianism, still de-
termined by an accumulation rule that looks pretty much like the standard
Golden Rule, i.e. f 0(k) = +n  1, the mere fact that egalitarianism involves a
lower optimal fertility implies also a higher optimal capital than under average
utilitarianism. The reason is the following. Egalitarianism, by focusing on the
worst-o¤ individuals in the cohort, recommends a welfare-neutral consumption
at the old age, which restricts the intergenerational gains from fertility. The
"Samuelson e¤ect" being reduced, the optimal fertility under egalitarianism is
lower, implying a higher optimal capital. Thus, contrary to what one may
expect, egalitarianism reinforces the necessity to accumulate capital.
In sum, the egalitarian social objective recommends, in comparison to aver-
age utilitarianism, a lower old-age consumption, and a lower preventive health
spending. Those di¤erences leave the optimal capital equal to its utilitarian
optimal level when the fertility rate is exogenously given. However, once fertil-
ity is also a part of the social planners optimization problem, the egalitarian
optimum involves, in general, a higher capital and a lower fertility than under
utilitarianism. Thus, it is through the optimal fertility decision that the shift to
egalitarianism a¤ects the optimal capital accumulation. Without that channel,
egalitarianism would imply the same capital level as under utilitarianism.
5 The egalitarian second-best problem
The egalitarian rst-best solution may face strong resistance among policy cir-
cles. Imposing a zero investment in health in the name of the - possibly few -
unlucky individuals who turn out to be short-lived is questionable. This is the
reason why we now turn to a second-best framework, where health expenditures
take an interior value. In this section, we will consider the social planners prob-
lem in a second-best context, where health spending are not directly chosen by
the social planner. For that purpose, we consider three distinct cases:21
A1 Health spending per worker are constant: ht = h > 0.
A2 Health spending per worker are a constant fraction  of labour produc-
tivity: ht = !(kt).
21Those cases are also studied in de la Croix and Ponthiere (2010), who focus on the
utilitarian optimum.
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A3 Health spending per worker are a constant fraction  of the output per
worker: ht = f(kt).
The case A1 coincides with standard OLG models with xed life expectancy
1 + (h).22 The case A2 includes the economy considered by Chakraborty
(2004). The case A3 makes health spending depend on the whole social income.
Under case A1, the egalitarian social planners problem can be rewritten as:
max
c;d;k;n
u(c) + 

f(k)  k (n+    1)  h  c  (
h)
n
d

+  [u(d)]
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, whereas
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for
old-age welfare u(d). The rst-order conditions are:
u0(c) =  (25)

(h)
n
= u0(d) (26)
f 0(k) = n+    1 (27)
k =
(h)
n2
d (28)
as well as the conditions
  0; f(k)  k (n+    1)  h  c+ (
h)
n
d (29)
  0; u(d)  0 (30)
with complementary slackness.
From (27), it appears that, as in the rst-best problem, the optimal capital
accumulation remains determined by the standard Golden Rule. Old-age con-
sumption remains equal to c. Note also that, on the basis of (28), we obtain
that, because of the higher preventive spending, there is now a higher intergen-
erational redistribution e¤ect, which leads to a higher fertility ceteris paribus.
Turning now to cases A2 and A3, the social planners problem becomes:
max
c;d;k;n
u(c) + 

f(k)  k (n+    1)  h(k)  c  (h(k))
n
d

+  [u(d)]
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint,
whereas  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity con-
straint u(d)  0. The rst-order conditions are:
u0(c) =  (31)

(h(k))
n
= u0(d) (32)
f 0(k)  (n+    1)  h0(k)  
0(h(k))
n
h0(k)d = 0 (33)
k =
(h)
n2
d (34)
22The standard Diamond model relies on  = 1.
14
as well as the conditions
  0; f(k)  k (n+    1)  h(k)  c+ (h(k))
n
d (35)
  0; u(d)  0 (36)
with complementary slackness.
As above, second-period consumption equals the welfare-neutral level c. Sub-
stituting for d = c, one can rewrite (33) as:
f 0(k) = n+    1 + h0(k)

1 +
0(h(k))
n
c

That equality characterizes the optimal second-best capital level. Note that,
under h0(k) = 0, we are back to the standard Golden Rule. However, once cap-
ital accumulation raises health investment, the optimal capital becomes, ceteris
paribus, lower than under the standard Golden Rule. That comparison holds
only ceteris paribus, that is, for an equal fertility level n. One can, nonetheless,
expect the optimal fertility to di¤er in the rst-best and in the second-best,
simply on the grounds that a higher health investment h raises the intergenera-
tional redistribution e¤ect, inviting a higher optimal fertility for an equal level
of capital k. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 4 The egalitarian second-best optimum fc; d; k; ng is such that:
c = f(k)  k (n +    1)  h(k)  (h(k
))
n
c
d = c
k =
(h(k))
(n)2
c
Regarding optimal capital, we have:
under A1 : f 0(k) = n +    1
under A2 : f 0(k) = n +    1  kf 00(k)

1 +
0(h(k))
n
c

under A3 : f 0(k) = n +    1 + f 0(k)

1 +
0(h(k))
n
c

Proof. See the above FOCs.
If fertility was xed to some exogenous level n = n, the optimal capital
at the second-best would be, under case A1, the same as it is at the rst-
best. Moreover, under cases A2 and A3, the optimal second-best capital would
be strictly inferior to its rst-best level. The reason is that a higher capital
tends here to foster health investment, and, hence, raises the inactive to active
population ratio n , which reduces consumption possibilities ceteris paribus.
23
Hence, it follows that the second-best egalitarian optimal capital is, under case
A1, equal to the one under utilitarianism, and, under cases A2 and A3, it is
lower than the utilitarian optimal capital.
23That negative e¤ect of capital accumulation on consumption possibilities depends on the
shape of the survival function, through the derivative 0(h(k)).
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When fertility is a part of the planners choice, it is more complicated to
compare the rst-best and second-best egalitarian optima. To see this, let us
consider the case A1. Comparing the condition for rst-best (FB) fertility and
second-best (SB) fertility, we have:
keFB =
~
(neFB)2
c and keSB =
(h)
(neSB)2
c
it appears that, for a given k, the larger survival probability at the second-best
raises the Samuelson e¤ect (RHS), and, as such, the optimal fertility is, at the
second-best, larger than at the rst-best for a given k. That result is important,
but, here again, the optimal second-best capital is a function of the optimal
fertility, so that a ceteris paribus rationale is not satisfactory. Proposition 5
summarizes our results.24
Proposition 5 Consider case A1. We have:
keSB ? keFB () f 0(k)   + 1 ? 2k!0(k)
Assuming Cobb-Douglas production yt = Akt and a full depreciation of capital,
we obtain:
 if  > 1=2, we have: keFB < keSBku and neFB > neSBnu ;
 if  = 1=2, we have: keFB = ku = keSB and nu = neFB = neSB;
 if  < 1=2, we have: keFB > keSBku and neFB < neSBnu :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, if we take the realistic case where  < 1=2, the optimal second-best
capital under egalitarianism is lower than at the rst-best, and the optimal
second-best fertility is larger than at the rst-best. The intuition is that the
Samuelson e¤ect is reinforced by the larger proportion of survivors associated
with h > 0, which pushes, at the end of the day, towards a higher optimal
fertility and a lower optimal capital than in the rst-best. Hence, the extent
to which egalitarianism leads to a higher optimal capital than utilitarianism is
lower at the second-best than at the rst-best. Note, however, that, if  < 1=2
and h < hu, it is still the case, even at the second-best, that egalitarianism
recommends a lower fertility and a higher capital than utilitarianism. The
addition of the constraint h > 0 reduces the gap, but it still exists.
In sum, the way in which the introduction of exogenous health investment
a¤ects the optimal accumulation depends on whether fertility is part of the
planners choice or not. This dependency on fertility is well illustrated in the
case A1 (xed health investment). When fertility is exogenous, the second-best
capital is equal to its rst-best level. Once fertility is a choice variable, the
second-best capital is generally inferior to its rst-best level, because of a larger
Samuelson e¤ect, which pushes towards a larger fertility and a lower capital.
24For simplicity of presentation, we focus here on case A1, but similar conditions can be
derived for cases A2 and A3.
16
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of the present paper was to revisit the optimal capital accumulation
in the context where lifetime is risky and where individuals turn out to have
unequal longevities. For that purpose, we compared, in a two-period OLG
model, two long-run social optima. On the one hand, the average utilitarian
criterion, which consists of maximizing the average welfare at the stationary
equilibrium; on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian criterion, which consists
of maximizing the welfare of the worst-o¤ born at the steady-state.
It has been shown that whether egalitarianism leads to a higher optimal
capital or not depends on whether fertility is chosen by the social planner or
not. When fertility is not chosen, the optimal capital is, under egalitarian-
ism, exactly the same as under utilitarianism. Indeed, in that case, egalitarian
concerns, which remain intragenerational, are not relevant for discussing the op-
timal capital accumulation, which is an intergenerational issue. However, that
intragenerational versus intergenerational divide vanishes once fertility is chosen
by the social planner. Indeed, in that case, the egalitarian optimum involves,
under general conditions, a higher optimal capital than under utilitarianism,
and, also, a lower optimal fertility. The reason is that egalitarianism, by imply-
ing lower old-age consumption, weakens intergenerational gains from fertility,
i.e. the Samuelson e¤ect, and, hence, the optimal fertility.
Thus egalitarian concerns do not reduce, but do actually raise optimal cap-
ital accumulation. That result is somewhat surprising, since one would expect
egalitarian concerns to lower the optimal capital. Nonetheless, the present study
shows that, contrary to what one may expect, capital accumulation becomes
even more necessary when one is only concerned with the worst-o¤s. That re-
sult was also shown to be globally robust to the shift to a second-best set up
where health investment is exogenously related to the capital level, even if the
introduction of some constrained level of health investment reduces, in general,
the optimal capital in comparison to the rst-best.
Finally, let us notice some limitations of the present study. A rst issue
that remains to be explored consists of the implementability of the egalitarian
optimum characterized here. That question can be formulated as follows: under
which scal instruments could a government decentralize the egalitarian social
optimum, and induce the fair capital accumulation? That question is not a
trivial one, especially when fertility is also endogenous, since, in that case, the
study of the decentralization is likely to be sensitive to the structure of parental
preferences in terms of fertility. As such, the study of decentralization would
require another paper on its own. Besides the implementation issue, one should
also remind that the capital accumulation rule studied here is "fair" only in a
particular sense. That capital accumulation rule, based on the maximization of
the worst-o¤s welfare, is concerned with correcting for the arbitrariness of the
time of death. However, there exists, from the point of view of history, another
major source of welfare inequalities, which is also arbitrary: the time of birth.
Given that the present study focused on the stationary equilibrium only, this
could not deal with that issue, which would require to explore the General-
ized Golden Rule and its egalitarian variants in the context of an endogenous
demography. This task is also left on our research agenda.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Under utilitarianism, the optimal capital and fertility levels satisfy respectively:
f 0(ku) =  + nu   1
ku =
(hu)
(nu)2
du
On the contrary, at the egalitarian optimum, these satisfy respectively:
f 0(ke) =  + ne   1
ke =
~
(ne)2
c
Substituting for the Golden Rule in the optimal fertility condition, we have:
ku (f 0(ku)   + 1)2 = (hu)du
ke (f 0(ke)   + 1)2 = ~c
Remind that (hu) > ~ and du > c, so that (hu)du > ~c. Hence, if  (k) 
k (f 0(k)   + 1)2 is increasing (resp. decreasing) in k, we have ku > ke (resp.
ku < ke). We have:
0 (k) = (f 0(k)   + 1)2 + k2 (f 0(k)   + 1) f 00(k)
It is positive if and only if:
f 0(k)   + 1 > 2k!0(k)
Taking the example of the Cobb-Douglas production yt = Akt , we obtain:
Ak 1(2  1) >    1
Hence, under  = 1, ku > ke holds if and only if  > 1=2. The rest of
Proposition 3 follows from similar rationales
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 5
UnderA1, the optimal capital under egalitarianism is still given by the standard
Golden Rule, but the di¤erence is that the optimal fertility rate n may di¤er
signicantly in the rst-best and the second-best. To see this, note that, if one
substitutes for the Golden Rule in the FOC for optimal fertility, one obtains:
ksb
 
f 0(ksb)   + 12 = c(h)
Hence, if the LHS is increasing in ksb, a higher RHS in the second-best in
comparison to the rst-best (i.e. c(h) > c~) must imply a higher optimal
capital level. Therefore, if the condition:
f 0(k)   + 1 > 2k!0(k)
is true, then the second-best optimal capital is larger than the rst-best optimal
capital, and the second-best fertility is lower than the rst-best fertility. Under
a Cobb-Douglas technology and a full depreciation of capital, ksb exceeds kfb
if and only if:
Ak 1 > 2kA(1  )k 2 ()  > 1
2
The rest of Proposition 5 follows from grouping that condition with the second
part of Proposition 3.
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